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Abstract 
This paper presents the results of a computer si-
mulation of the NASA Autonomous Flight Rules 
(AFR) concept for airborne self-separation in air-
space shared with conventional Instrument Flight 
Rules (IFR) traffic. This study was designed to de-
termine the impact of varying levels of intent infor-
mation from IFR aircraft on the performance of AFR 
conflict detection and resolution. The study used Au-
tomatic Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast (ADS-B) 
to supply IFR intent, but other methods such as an 
uplink from a ground-based System Wide Informa-
tion Management (SWIM) network could alternative-
ly supply this information. The independent variables 
of the study consist of the number of ADS-B trajecto-
ry change reports broadcast by IFR aircraft and the 
time interval between those reports. The conflict de-
tection and resolution metrics include: the number of 
conflicts and losses of separation, the average con-
flict warning time, and the amount of time spent in 
strategic vs. tactical flight modes (i.e., whether the 
autoflight system was decoupled from the planned 
route in the Flight Management System in order to 
respond to a short-notice traffic conflict). The results 
show a measurable benefit of broadcasting IFR intent 
vs. relying on state-only broadcasts. The results of 
this study will inform ongoing separation assurance 
research and FAA NextGen design decisions for the 
sharing of trajectory intent information in the Nation-
al Airspace System. 
Introduction 
The separation function performed by the 
ground-based air navigation service provider (ANSP) 
contributes to the extraordinarily low risk of mid-air 
collision between commercial aircraft in the sky to-
day. Human controllers provide essential separation 
services to IFR aircraft, relying on a combination of 
procedural and surveillance-based control approaches 
to ensure aircraft maintain a safe distance from one 
another at all times. The aircrew on the IFR flight 
deck has limited knowledge of surrounding traffic 
and thus only a minimal ability to separate from other 
aircraft without support from the ground. 
However, the emergence of ADS-B technology 
has the potential to change this reality. In support of 
NextGen, the FAA has mandated that aircraft equip 
by 2020 to frequently broadcast a state vector via 
ADS-B OUT, derived from GPS and other on-board 
sources of state data. With a sky full of aircraft fre-
quently broadcasting their current position and veloc-
ity, an aircraft equipped to receive these reports via 
ADS-B IN would have access to an accurate and up-
to-date picture of the traffic within its vicinity. 
The availability of this surveillance information 
on the flight deck is an enabler for a concept pre-
viously known as free flight [1], more generically 
known as self-separation. This idea posits that, with 
detailed traffic information on the flight deck, the 
aircrew can identify potential trajectory conflicts with 
other aircraft and make course changes to resolve 
them autonomously, doing so without active supervi-
sion or control by a ground service. Such a mode of 
flight is a significant departure from conventional 
IFR operations that require ground-based separation 
services. Accordingly, the NASA concept has been 
formulated as a new set of Autonomous Flight Rules 
(AFR), recently described by Wing and Cotton in 
[2,3].  
In contrast to other concepts which place self-
separating aircraft in segregated regions of airspace, 
AFR is by necessity a mixed-operations concept. 
Newly-introduced AFR aircraft must be capable of 
coexisting with conventional IFR traffic in the same 
airspace. This integration of self-separating and 
ground-separated traffic presents unique challenges 
for the design of the AFR concept. 
One such challenge is related to the availability 
of intent information from IFR aircraft. While IFR 
aircraft are mandated to broadcast their current posi-
tion and velocity, this broadcast does not include in-
formation about the aircraft’s intent. By intent, this 
paper refers to the aircraft’s planned trajectory 
changes in the near future, consisting of upcoming 
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turns and altitude changes within the next 10 minutes. 
Without this information, IFR trajectory changes are 
less predictable to AFR aircraft, creating the potential 
for more short-term AFR-IFR conflict situations. The 
availability of this intent information, and the conse-
quences to AFR operations given varying levels of 
intent, are the focus of this paper.  
This paper is organized as follows. First, back-
ground on the AFR concept and the problem of IFR 
intent information availability is presented. Then, we 
describe an unpiloted computer simulation experi-
ment conducted in the NASA Langley Air Traffic 
Operations Laboratory to study the effects of varying 
levels of intent broadcast on the performance of AFR 
conflict detection and resolution. Finally, the results 
of this study are discussed along with conclusions 
and recommendations that can be made for sharing 
trajectory intent information in future NextGen de-
signs for the National Airspace System. 
Background 
Definitions 
Loss of separation. A loss of separation (LOS) 
has occurred between two aircraft when they are 
closer than a given separation standard—in this pa-
per, 5 nmi laterally and 1000 ft vertically. 
Conflict. Two aircraft are said to be in conflict 
when a loss of separation is predicted to occur be-
tween them in the future. 
Conflict detection. An on-board airborne separa-
tion assurance system (ASAS) continually scans sur-
veillance information from surrounding aircraft for 
conflicts within a given time horizon. This function 
depends on an accurate prediction of an aircraft’s 
trajectory into the future. 
Conflict resolution. Once a conflict is detected, 
the ASAS must guide the pilot to alter the ownship’s 
trajectory so that a loss of separation is no longer 
predicted to occur. Conflict detection and resolution 
are often referred to together as “CD&R.” 
Strategic. When the autoflight system is fully 
coupled with the flight management system (FMS) 
(i.e., in LNAV and VNAV modes), this is referred to 
as strategic flight. Conflict resolutions accomplished 
via FMS route modifications are referred to as stra-
tegic resolutions. 
Tactical. Complementary to strategic operations, 
tactical flight refers to modes were the autoflight sys-
tem is decoupled with the FMS, such as track select 
and altitude hold modes. Tactical conflict resolutions 
are accomplished via mode control panel (MCP) alti-
tude and track changes rather than FMS route mod-
ifications. 
Autonomous Flight Rules 
The reader is directed to [2,3] for a thorough his-
tory and description of the AFR concept. The funda-
mental elements of AFR are summarized here. 
An operator files a flight plan under the rules of 
AFR as an alternative to an IFR or VFR flight plan. 
By filing AFR, the pilot agrees to take on the respon-
sibility for maintaining the separation of the aircraft 
from all other traffic. 
The AFR pilot relies on an on-board ASAS (de-
cision support tool) to detect conflicts with other air-
craft, and must follow the tool’s guidance to alter 
course and promptly resolve those conflicts. The pilot 
must also use the tool to probe planned maneuvers 
and route changes for potential conflicts, ensuring 
that any move is sufficiently conflict-free before ex-
ecuting it. 
In similar fashion, the pilot uses the on-board 
tool to avoid weather and restricted airspace and to fit 
into the ANSP’s traffic flow management plans (e.g., 
to meet a required time of arrival constraint at a me-
tering fix of the terminal airspace).  
For conflicts between a pair of AFR aircraft, a 
set of right-of-way rules determines which aircraft 
acts first to resolve the conflict. For AFR-IFR con-
flicts, the AFR aircraft always gives way to the IFR 
aircraft, relieving the ANSP of the burden to monitor 
for and resolve conflicts with AFR aircraft. 
The AFR operator, complying with these rules, 
is afforded a great deal of operational flexibility. 
AFR aircraft can fly at economical altitudes and 
speeds along optimal routes, bypass miles-in-trail 
restrictions and many ground delay programs, find 
better routes through weather, and fly with a freedom 
similar to VFR operations, but in instrument meteo-
rological conditions. The benefits from reduced re-
strictions and increased operational flexibility are 
expected to significantly exceed the cost of equipage 
and the burden of taking on separation responsibility 
to fly AFR [4]. 
  
AFR as developed thus far is primarily an en-
route concept of operations. An aircraft may depart 
under a conventional IFR clearance, transition to an 
AFR clearance for climb, cruise, and initial descent, 
and regain an IFR clearance upon entrance to the 
terminal area. In future work, it is envisioned that 
AFR will be integrated with flight deck interval man-
agement and spacing concepts for arrivals [5]. 
The word autonomous with respect to the AFR 
concept refers to the operator’s autonomy to fly with 
great independence from outside supervision or con-
trol. It does not refer to the sense of “autonomous” 
machine control that is sometimes associated with 
robotic systems such as unmanned aerial vehicles. 
While there are parallels between aerial robotics and 
the automation tools that are enabling of manned au-
tonomous flight, the pilot is firmly in command and 
in the loop with respect to the AFR concept. 
AFR has been developed and evaluated in a 
number of studies over the past decade. Computer 
simulations have addressed the effects of traffic den-
sity and encounter geometry [6], pilot delay [7], 
ADS-B range and interference [8], wind uncertainty 
[9], and dynamic weather avoidance [10]. AFR-IFR 
mixed operations have also been studied through hu-
man-in-the-loop experiments from the perspective of 
both the aircrew and ground controllers [11]. 
ADS-B State and Intent Broadcasts 
AFR is an application of broadcast information 
sharing. Direct, two-way, explicit communication is 
not required between AFR and traffic aircraft to per-
form this operation. Each AFR aircraft is equipped 
with a compatible ASAS that operates on the ADS-B 
OUT messages from surrounding traffic; in this fa-
shion, the functions for separation assurance are dis-
tributed and coordinated implicitly by implementing 
the same procedures and compatible computer algo-
rithms on each AFR aircraft. 
The FAA 2020 ADS-B OUT mandate [12] re-
quires all aircraft operating in Mode C transponder 
airspace to broadcast a state vector report via ADS-B 
OUT. This vector includes the latitude, longitude, 
altitude, airspeed, ground track, and other informa-
tion necessary to define the state of the aircraft. State 
information is essential for self-separation, as it 
enables the basic awareness of traffic location and 
direction of flight. 
The current state of an aircraft can be projected 
forward into the future along a steady-state trajectory 
for conflict detection. However, the state alone does 
not provide any information as to whether the aircraft 
is planning an upcoming turn or altitude change. 
Thus, in addition to the current state of a nearby air-
craft, it is useful (but not necessarily required) to 
know what the aircraft is planning to do in the future; 
this is referred to as intent information. 
The Minimum Aviation Performance Standards 
(MASPS) for ADS-B provides for two kinds of intent 
broadcast: short-term target state reports [13, §3.4.7] 
and long-term trajectory change reports [13, §3.4.8]. 
The target state (TS) report is depicted in Figure 1. 
When the aircraft is currently performing a maneuv-
er, the TS report includes information about the in-
tended state of the aircraft once the maneuver has 
completed. In the case of a turn, the TS report in-
cludes the target track angle, and in the case of a 
climb or descent, it includes the level-out altitude. 
The TS report is only useful during such a maneuver; 
when the aircraft is flying straight and level, the TS 
report is identical to the aircraft’s current state vector. 
 
Figure 1. ADS-B state and target state reports. 
Trajectory change (TC) reports are shown in 
Figure 2. Aircraft broadcast a trajectory change point 
(TCP) for each upcoming turn and altitude change, 
up to a fixed number of points. Each TCP includes 
information to define a turn or altitude change point 
in time and space. Due to bandwidth limitations in 
the 1090 MHz Mode S channel, these points are 
broadcast one-at-a-time, sequentially. After the last 
point in the sequence is broadcast, the cycle begins 
again with the first point. The time interval between 
the broadcast of these points is constrained by the 
channel bandwidth. 
  
 
Figure 2. ADS-B trajectory change reports. 
Each lateral TCP includes both the track-in an-
gle and the track-out angle, so that the last waypoint 
in the sequence (such as point 3 in Figure 2) includes 
some information with which to project a path 
beyond itself. However, in the case of vertical way-
points, the current ADS-B TC report specification 
[13, §3.4.8] does not include a final altitude, vertical 
speed, or other indication that would help another 
aircraft to predict its vertical path given one point 
alone. Thus, while broadcasting only one TCP is suf-
ficient to characterize one turn, it is not enough to 
define an upcoming altitude change. This limitation 
in the ADS-B specification has implications for the 
analysis of the results of the experiment described 
later in this paper. 
Equipage for ADS-B Intent Broadcast 
The ADS-B mandate requires aircraft to broad-
cast a state vector only; the TS intent broadcast is 
optional, and the TC message is not included in the 
mandate. While the equipage of AFR aircraft for in-
tent broadcast is specified in the AFR concept and 
can be expected as part of the “price of admission” to 
achieve AFR benefits, it is more difficult to motivate 
IFR operators to equip. There are additional expenses 
to equip for intent broadcast over the mandated state-
only broadcast. For example, intent information gen-
erally resides in separate equipment from the ADS-B 
transponder, such as in the FMS or a panel-mounted 
GPS navigation system, and data connections be-
tween these systems are not trivial.  
These expenses compound the problem that IFR 
operators do not receive a clear and tangible benefit 
to equipping for intent broadcast: the intent informa-
tion is to the benefit of the AFR operator, and it is not 
required for IFR operations. While it can be argued 
that there are numerous indirect benefits for IFR op-
erators if AFR is successful, this is likely not to be a 
sufficient motivator. 
There are other potential sources of IFR intent 
information. One NextGen development is the Sys-
tem Wide Information Management (SWIM) net-
work, which is being designed to facilitate the ex-
change of a variety of information between National 
Airspace System users [14]. One SWIM component 
is the “flight object,” which may eventually contain 
trajectory intent information for IFR flights as main-
tained by controllers and computers on the ground. It 
is conceivable that this intent information could be 
made available to an AFR consumer on the flight 
deck through a rebroadcast or on-demand uplink. IFR 
intent available through SWIM could take the place 
of ADS-B TC reports, without additional equipage by 
IFR operators. 
Autonomous Operations Planner 
Early work in this area suggested that a simple 
traffic display is not sufficient for human pilots to 
perform self-separation effectively. Support from 
computer automation on the flight deck is essential 
for solving complex traffic problems. Since 1998, 
NASA Langley has been developing a research pro-
totype decision support tool for AFR operations 
known as the Autonomous Operations Planner 
(AOP). 
AOP receives ADS-B state and intent reports 
from aircraft within surveillance range and continual-
ly scans for conflicts with traffic out to a specified 
look-ahead horizon (e.g., 10 minutes). In the event a 
conflict is detected, AOP alerts the aircrew and pro-
vides guidance for resolving the conflict. Depending 
on the situation, AOP may provide a strategic resolu-
tion via a modified FMS route, or it may give tactical 
commands to be flown using the MCP. 
AOP also provides a conflict prevention capabil-
ity for pilot-initiated maneuvers, probing FMS and 
MCP plans to ensure they are conflict-free before 
they are executed. In addition to protecting against 
conflicts, routes generated by AOP are optimized to 
maximize flight performance and to meet FMS tra-
jectory constraints. In addition to traffic, AOP has 
  
also been developed to take polygonal special-use 
airspace and convective weather areas into account. 
A more complete description of AOP can be 
found in [15]. 
Simulation Environment 
To investigate the impact of IFR intent availabil-
ity on AFR conflict detection and resolution, a simu-
lation was conducted in the NASA Langley Air Traf-
fic Operations Laboratory (ATOL). The ATOL has 
facilities for conducting large-scale human-in-the-
loop and unpiloted computer simulations of advanced 
air traffic management concepts. 
In this simulation, each aircraft was imple-
mented as one instance of the NASA Aircraft Simu-
lation for Traffic Operations Research (ASTOR) plat-
form. The ASTOR is a multi-fidelity flight simulator 
supporting realistic displays and controls representa-
tive of a Boeing 777, twin-engine transport aircraft 
performance model, fully-function autoflight system 
and FMS, and a digital avionics data bus emulating 
realistic internal and external data communications, 
including ADS-B IN and OUT. 
Each ASTOR executes on a separate rack-
mounted Windows PC blade server. ASTORs com-
municate with one another during the simulation us-
ing an implementation of the High-Level Architec-
ture (HLA) standard over a local network. The run-
ning network of ASTOR simulators is referred to as 
the Airspace and Traffic Operations Simulation 
(ATOS). 
Each ASTOR contains a separate instance of 
AOP performing conflict detection and resolution. 
The aircraft is flown by a rule-based “pilot model” 
software agent, which is responsible for following 
AOP’s guidance in the event a conflict resolution is 
required.  
The simulated experiment airspace is shown in 
Figure 3, and the progression of a typical flight is 
shown in Figure 4. Aircraft are instantiated at random 
points on the 320 nmi diameter outer circle (A). Each 
aircraft is randomly assigned a route that crosses the 
inner 160 nmi experiment area circle, and onward to 
a metering fix and destination airport beyond. 
AOP is permitted a “grace period” to ignore 
conflicts between A and B because those conflicts 
would have been detected and resolved in the unsi-
mulated flight prior to arriving at A. Approximately 
10 minutes of flying time is allowed before reaching 
B. Flying time across the inner circle (between B and 
C) is approximately 20 minutes. Upon reaching the 
inner circle boundary again (C), the flight is termi-
nated. 
The size of the experiment area was chosen to 
give approximately thirty minutes of flying time to 
each ASTOR (from A to C). This gives each aircraft 
a chance to perform typically one complete conflict 
detection and resolution cycle during the simulation; 
sometimes several. 
 
Figure 3. Simulation area.  
 
Figure 4. Sample flight. 
Aircraft are initialized in cruise at altitudes un-
iformly distributed between FL 290 and 390. Aircraft 
generally remain in cruise throughout the simulation, 
although they may occasionally execute step climbs 
and descents for conflict resolution. 
Aircraft are generated at a rate to create a densi-
ty of 60–70 aircraft in the inner circle. Based on the 
size of the experiment area, this density is roughly 
2X the level of traffic of high-altitude sectors in to-
day’s NAS. The purpose of the simulation environ-
  
ment is not to match the pattern of traffic or traffic 
density in a particular airspace; rather, it is to create 
enough traffic so as to exercise AOP’s CD&R algo-
rithms under random conflict geometries and sur-
rounding traffic patterns. 
Each simulation included a moving weather cell 
represented by a translating and morphing avoidance 
area polygon. Although this study was not focused on 
weather avoidance, the weather polygon provided a 
disturbance to encourage aircraft trajectory changes, 
which are important for this study. The pilot model 
used AOP to avoid the weather polygon as it does for 
traffic. 
Each simulation case executed for 2 hours and 
20 minutes. In this time, roughly 550 aircraft were 
simulated. As aircraft flew through the experiment 
and terminated, the ASTOR was recycled for a new 
flight. In this way, the simulation was accomplished 
with a set of approximately 120 machines. The size 
of the simulation was restrained primarily by the 
number of machines and the duration of all of the 
simulation cases, which ran in real time.  
To study mixed operations, it is necessary to si-
mulate both AFR and IFR aircraft. AFR operations 
are well represented by the pilot model and AOP. 
However, no ground-side for IFR operations was si-
mulated here. In lieu of a true IFR simulation, a 
pseudo-IFR simulation capability was employed, de-
picted in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5. Pseudo-IFR simulation approach. 
 
In this approach, “IFR” aircraft in the simulation 
used AOP and the pilot model in the same way as the 
AFR aircraft. However, “IFR” aircraft received only 
the ADS-B messages from other “IFR” aircraft; they 
were essentially ignorant of AFR traffic. In this way, 
the “IFR” aircraft remain separated from each other, 
as would aircraft managed by the ground, while 
AFR-IFR and AFR-AFR separation is performed on-
ly by AFR aircraft.  
This environment represents a very rough ap-
proximation of mixed operations, but it is considered 
acceptable for studying the mixed-operations perfor-
mance of just the AFR aircraft. While the pseudo-IFR 
aircraft in the simulation are not performing true IFR 
operations with a ground controller in the loop, their 
behavior is suitable to serve a specific purpose in this 
study: to provide IFR targets with some element of 
trajectory unpredictability with which to evaluate 
AFR conflict detection and resolution. 
For the remainder of this paper, the pseudo-IFR 
aircraft will be referred to simply as IFR. 
Experiment Design 
Research Question 
This experiment was designed to answer the fol-
lowing general research question: What are the ef-
fects of varying the availability of IFR aircraft intent 
information on the safety and efficiency performance 
of AOP conflict detection and resolution for AFR 
aircraft? In particular, availability of intent informa-
tion is defined as the number of TCPs shared and the 
time interval between each TCP broadcast. 
Independent Variables 
Number of TCPs broadcast by IFR aircraft. The 
most important factor in defining the amount of in-
tent information available is the maximum number of 
TCPs broadcast via ADS-B in each cycle. This inde-
pendent variable was tested with values of 0, 2, 3, 
and 4 TCPs. In the zero TCP case, The IFR aircraft 
broadcast only the state vector report. The maximum 
setting of four TCPs was chosen here based on expe-
rience gained in early testing that found diminishing 
returns on the benefit of broadcasting more than four 
TCPs. Only the number of IFR TCPs was varied 
here; the number of TCPs broadcast by each AFR 
aircraft was fixed at four. 
Time interval between TCP broadcasts. The oth-
er parameter defining availability of intent informa-
tion is the time interval between TC message broad-
casts and thus the total time to receive a complete 
intent update. Interval settings of 3, 10, and 
20 seconds were tested. 
  
The shortest interval of three seconds was se-
lected based on an analysis of the maximum number 
of Mode S extended squitters (messages) per second 
available for ADS-B TCPs in the Minimum Opera-
tional Performance Standards (MOPS) for ADS-B 
[16]. The MOPS places a cap of 6.2 extended squit-
ters per second (ES/s) on the rate of ADS-B message 
transmissions [16, §2.2.3.3.1.3]. 5.4 ES/S of this al-
lowance is used for other messages (such as the state 
vector and aircraft status messages), leaving 0.8 ES/s 
available for TC messages [16, §O.4]. This budget is 
halved since a complete set of TC information re-
quires both a “basic” and “supplemental” message, 
giving a TCP budget of 0.4 ES/s. The inverse of the 
message rate gives the interval of (1 / 0.4) = 2.5 s/ES. 
This value was rounded up to 3 s in this study, giving 
the minimum setting for the TCP broadcast interval. 
The interval of 10 s is a maximum interval based 
on a requirement on the allowable amount of time to 
receive TCP changes in the MASPS [13]. For a 
worst-case head-on encounter between two aircraft, 
the MASPS makes a safety-based suggestion that the 
first TCP be received within 41 s of entering an as-
sumed 90 nmi ADS-B reception range [13, §N.11.1]. 
Since the aircraft are broadcasting a maximum num-
ber of four TCPs in this simulation, the maximum 
allowable interval between TCPs in order to meet this 
recommendation is about 10 s. This was chosen as 
the intermediate setting for the interval in this study. 
Finally, 20 s was chosen as a large value for the 
purpose of probing the limits of AOP’s CD&R per-
formance with long delays between TCP broadcasts. 
Only the interval for IFR broadcasts is varied in this 
experiment; the AFR TCP broadcasts are fixed with a 
3 s interval. 
Dependent Variables 
While data was recorded for all aircraft in the 
simulation, the results presented in the following sec-
tion focus only on the AFR aircraft and their interac-
tions with IFR aircraft. Dependent variables related 
to conflicts were only analyzed for those encounters 
between an AFR and an IFR aircraft; AFR-AFR and 
IFR-IFR conflicts are not considered here. For the 
other variables related to the overall flight, only the 
AFR aircraft were considered. 
Number of traffic conflicts between AFR and 
IFR aircraft. During each simulation, all AOP con-
flict detections are recorded, and these events may be 
counted to give an indication of the amount of activi-
ty required by the AFR aircraft in performing self-
separation. 
Having more conflicts leads to more pilot alerts, 
more required AOP actions, and thus a greater work-
load on the aircrew. More conflict alerts may reduce 
the number of “missed detections” by providing more 
opportunities for the aircrew to employ AOP in en-
suring separation. By contrast, more conflict alerts 
may also increase the number of “false detections,” 
wherein the crew is prompted to maneuver unneces-
sarily for a conflict that has not been accurately pre-
dicted. 
Number of losses of separation between AFR 
and IFR aircraft. In contrast to the number of con-
flicts which only measures predicted LOSs, the simu-
lation also counts actual LOSs that occur. This num-
ber is directly related to the level of safety of the 
overall AFR operation, and it is the goal of the AFR 
concept, procedures, and the AOP tool to drive the 
number of losses of separation to as close to zero as 
possible, while still enabling an efficient and benefi-
cial mode of operations to the user. 
Time remaining to first loss of separation at ini-
tial conflict detection. At the first detection of a con-
flict, there is a certain time remaining until the air-
craft are predicted to lose separation. This essentially 
represents the amount of warning time that the pilot 
has to act to resolve the conflict. Having less time-to-
LOS gives the pilot less time to act to resolve the 
conflict, possibly leading to more tactical maneuver-
ing. 
Percentage of traffic conflicts resolved tactical-
ly. Most conflicts are resolved through some pilot 
action. Depending on the situation, the conflict may 
be resolved strategically through a modified FMS 
route, or tactically by MCP direction (e.g., a 15° 
heading change). The type of resolution is recorded 
for each AFR-IFR conflict. Tactical conflict resolu-
tion is more workload intensive and results in a tem-
porary loss of the aircraft’s predictability as per-
ceived by neighboring traffic, since the it requires the 
aircraft to depart the FMS route. 
Percent time in tactical flight mode. The flight 
mode of each AFR aircraft over time is recorded, and 
it can be determined how much time the autoflight 
system was coupled vs. uncoupled with the FMS. 
Again, strategic flight is preferred over tactical flight, 
  
for reasons of pilot workload, trajectory predictabili-
ty, as well as the fact that flying coupled with the 
FMS allows the pilot to take advantage of the flight 
optimization features of the FMS and AOP. 
Lateral flight-path deviation. For each AFR air-
craft as-flown path length from start to finish can be 
compared to the aircraft’s original route at initializa-
tion. The deviation represents the amount of addi-
tional distance flown on the ground due to traffic and 
weather avoidance during the simulation. Increased 
flight-path deviation is an indication of inefficiency 
induced on the performance of the flight due to the 
presence of other aircraft and the required execution 
of conflict resolution maneuvers. 
Full Factorial Design 
The experiment was designed around two inde-
pendent variables: the number of IFR TCPs and the 
IFR TCP broadcast interval. A test power analysis 
was performed to evaluate several experimental de-
sign options. The test power is the ability for the ex-
periment to detect the magnitude of the “signal” of 
each dependent variable amidst sources of random 
noise; i.e., the power to detect the signal-to-noise 
(SNR) ratio. A higher power is preferred; it is an in-
dication of how well the design is able to detect the 
SNR correctly. For example, a power of 80% for an 
SNR of 2:1 means that there is an 80% chance that 
the design will correctly detect that the signal is larg-
er than the random noise by a factor of 2. In many 
fields of research, an SNR of 2:1 is common, and a 
power of at least 80% is preferred.  
A two-factor factorial design with four settings 
for the number of IFR TCPs (1, 2, 3, and 4) and three 
TCP interval settings (3, 10, and 20 s) was evaluated 
(the interval is irrelevant for the zero TCP case where 
no TCPs are broadcast). Figure 6 shows the test pow-
er for several design options, given an SNR of 2:1. 
Each combination of independent variables re-
quires a certain number of simulation repetitions in 
order to provide a given experiment power. Figure 6 
shows that to achieve at least 80% power, five repeti-
tions are required; this number of repetitions was 
chosen for this experiment. The zero TCP case with 
five repetitions was then added to this design, result-
ing in a total of 65 simulation runs. Another power 
analysis was performed to ensure that the test power 
for the zero and non-zero TCPs was at least 80%. 
This second power analysis on the one-factor design 
of the number of TCPs confirmed a test power of 
83% with an SNR of 3:1. This process ensured that 
the selected design balanced available computing 
time and the quality of the data to meet statistical 
testing criteria.  
 
Figure 6. Experiment design test power analysis. 
The one TCP case presented a problem for the 
analysis of the results. As discussed previously, 
broadcasting only a single TCP is insufficient to cha-
racterize climbs and descents, making this setting 
unsuitable for consideration here. For these reasons, 
the one TCP cases are omitted from further presenta-
tion in this paper, even though they were part of the 
original experiment design and data collection.  The 
test power of the experiment remains unimpacted by 
this omission. 
The final experiment design, consisting of ten 
independent variable combinations at five repetitions 
each, is shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. Experiment runs. 
Scenario # IFR TCPs 
IFR TCP 
Interval [s] Reps
1 0 n/a 5 
2 2 3 5 
3 3 3 5 
4 4 3 5 
5 2 10 5 
6 3 10 5 
7 4 10 5 
8 2 20 5 
9 3 20 5 
10 4 20 5 
24 Runs
36 Runs
48 Runs
60 Runs
72 Runs
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
2 3 4 5 6
%
 Po
w
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# Repetitions
  
Results 
Number of Conflicts 
Figure 7 shows a box plot of the number of con-
flicts per flight hour across all experiment repetitions. 
The box plot gives a visual presentation of the center, 
spread, and outliers for each data set. The 25th and 
75th percentiles of the data are shown by the ends of 
the rectangular box. A line is drawn through the mid-
dle the box at the 50th percentile (median). Dashed 
lines extend from the box to the extreme values. 
 
Figure 7. No. of traffic conflicts per flight hour. 
One-way ANOVA revealed a significant effect 
of the presence vs. absence of IFR TCPs on the num-
ber of traffic conflicts (p < 0.0001). There are fewer 
AFR-IFR conflicts detected by AFR aircraft when 
IFR aircraft trajectory intent is available (TCP > 0) 
than when it is not (TCP = 0): roughly 2 conflicts per 
hour without TCPs, and between about 1 and 1.5 con-
flicts per hour with TCPs. With IFR TCPs available, 
an AFR aircraft has more information about IFR tra-
jectory changes, and AOP can suggest improved 
routes to better avoid IFR traffic during conflict reso-
lutions and weather avoidance route changes. Fewer 
conflicts means fewer required AFR pilot actions, 
reduced workload, and fewer chances for error. Few-
er conflict resolutions leads to fewer trajectory 
changes and therefore a more stable airspace. 
For the cases with more than one IFR TCP, two-
way ANOVA indicated no significant main effect for 
the number of TCPs (p = 0.213), indicating that the 
effect of this variable must be considered in its inte-
raction with the broadcast interval. 
ANOVA showed a significant main effect of the 
broadcast interval by itself (p < 0.0001); in general, 
shorter broadcast intervals yield fewer conflicts. This 
is intuitive; with less delay in the intent information 
shared by IFR aircraft, the AFR AOP is better able to 
suggest conflict-free routes. 
Finally, ANOVA revealed a significant interac-
tion between the number of IFR TCPs and the broad-
cast interval (p = 0.002). The interaction is roughly as 
follows: When the interval is lower (3 or 10 s), add-
ing more TCPs to the IFR broadcast is beneficial; it 
reduces the conflict count. However, the trend is re-
versed when the interval is 20 s. With this interval 
setting, adding TCPs noticeably increases the number 
of conflicts. This is counter to the intuition that add-
ing TCPs and thus providing more information about 
IFR intent to the AFR aircraft should improve the 
operation. 
This effect can be explained as follows. With a 
sequence of four TCPs, each TCP is broadcast in turn 
with the given delay. With a 20 s interval, it follows 
that it can take up to 20 × 4 = 80 s for the sequence to 
restart and re-broadcast the first TCP. Compare this 
to a 3 s interval, where it takes only 12 s to complete 
and restart the sequence. The effect is, for more TCPs 
in the sequence, the AFR aircraft must wait longer to 
receive a complete set of TCPs. This is compounded 
with the fact that the AFR aircraft will not always 
receive each TCP due to ADS-B signal interference 
and other disturbances [17]; it may occasionally have 
to wait for one or more subsequent broadcast cycles 
to receive a complete set of TCPs. 
The additional time to receive a complete TCP 
set is related to the observation that the first and 
second TCPs in the sequence are more important to 
the AFR aircraft than the third and beyond. The first 
and second TCPs represent the nearest upcoming tra-
jectory changes for the IFR aircraft, and they are 
more relevant in the time horizon of conflict detec-
tion and resolution. The ultimate conclusion to be 
drawn from this interaction between the number of 
TCPs and the broadcast interval is that it is better to 
have fewer TCPs at a shorter interval than more 
TCPs at a longer interval. 
  
Losses of Separation 
Table 2 shows the number of losses of separation 
across the runs as compared with the total flight time 
of AFR aircraft and the number of AFR-IFR con-
flicts. The LOSs are rare events in the simulation. 
While there are not enough of these events to draw 
statistically significant conclusions about the effects 
of the independent variables, the numbers generally 
appear to be consistent with the conclusions about the 
conflict counts in the previous section.  
Table 2. Losses of separation.  
IFR 
TCPs 
IFR TCP 
Interval 
[s] 
AFR 
Flight 
Hours 
AFR/ 
IFR 
Conflicts 
LOS 
0 n/a 528.7 1122 21 
2 
3 521.0 655 3 
10 546.5 758 9 
20 550.5 674 8 
3 
3 554.2 605 3 
10 538.7 711 4 
20 550.9 722 13 
4 
3 561.9 605 0 
10 563.9 654 2 
20 545.5 826 29 
 
LOSs are caused by a number of factors. As on-
ly AFR-IFR LOSs are shown here, chief among the 
contributors is the fact that IFR aircraft make trajec-
tory changes without regard to AFR aircraft. Addi-
tionally, encounters between climbing and descend-
ing aircraft tend to be troublesome due to the in-
creased difficulty in predicting vertical trajectories. 
Many LOSs can also be explained where the pilot 
model’s rule-based logic fails in a situation that could 
be managed by a human pilot. All LOSs observed in 
simulation, however rare, feed into the improvement 
of the AFR concept and the AOP software to drive 
this number as close to zero as possible. 
Time to First Loss of Separation 
Figure 8 shows the box plot for the median time 
to first loss of separation at initial conflict detection, 
across all experiment runs for AFR–IFR conflicts. 
Median analysis was used to reduce the effect of out-
liers on the results. As before with the number of 
conflicts, there is a significant, beneficial effect of the 
presence of IFR TCPs on the time to LOS 
(p < 0.0001). When broadcasting IFR TCPs, the me-
dian time to LOS is between 20 and 50 s greater than 
without TCPs (7.7 min vs. 8 to 8.5 min). This indi-
cates that the broadcast of IFR TCPs provides an 
overall increase in the amount of warning time LOS 
when a conflict is initially detected. Additional warn-
ing time provides more time to resolve the conflict 
and the potential for more efficient resolution ma-
neuvers. 
 
Figure 8. Median time to first loss of separation at 
initial conflict detection. 
The main effect of the broadcast interval is also 
significant; a shorter interval leads to a greater time 
to first LOS (p < 0.0001), following intuition. Loose-
ly, the amount of time saved by not waiting longer to 
receive critical TCPs translates into extra warning 
time on average. 
The main effect of the number of TCPs, along 
with the interaction between TCPs and interval, are 
not significant (p = 0.783 and 0.139 respectively), 
indicating that although having TCPs is better than 
not, no significant difference was found between 2, 3, 
or 4 TCPs on the warning time to the predicted LOS. 
In other words, the warning time enhancement bene-
fit from the availability of intent information was 
achieved with just two TCPs. 
In addition to the median, the distribution of the 
time to LOS can also show the benefit to intent avail-
ability. For example, with zero TCPs, there are 24% 
of conflicts that have a time to LOS less than five 
minutes, compared to 10% to 19% when intent is 
  
available. Intent availability significantly reduces the 
number of conflicts that appear with short warning 
times. 
Percentage of Conflicts Resolved Tactically 
Another indicator of CD&R performance is 
whether a conflict is resolved strategically (via FMS 
routes) or tactically (via MCP track and altitude 
changes). In this simulation, tactical resolutions were 
triggered for unresolved conflicts with less than five 
minutes remaining to LOS. This box plot is shown in 
Figure 9.  
 
Figure 9. Percentage of conflicts  
resolved tactically. 
The effects here are similar to those for the 
number of conflicts discussed previously. The benefit 
of having vs. not having IFR TCPs is significant 
(p < 0.0001). Roughly 30% of conflicts are resolved 
tactically when no IFR TCPs are broadcast vs. ap-
proximately 10% to 20% of conflicts when IFR TCPs 
are available. Fewer tactical resolutions generate less 
work for the pilot; in many situations it is preferred to 
use strategic (FMS-based) route changes. The strateg-
ic flying mode is also indicative of less “urgency” in 
pilot interactions with AOP. Tactical maneuvering 
also makes the AFR aircraft less predictable to other 
AFR aircraft in the vicinity because future tactical 
turns are not known and thus cannot be broadcasted. 
The main effect of the TCP broadcast interval is 
also significant (p = 0.005), indicating fewer tactical 
resolutions when the interval is shorter. The interac-
tion between the number of TCPs and the interval is 
also significant (p = 0.026), and reveal that it is better 
to have fewer TCPs at a shorter interval rather than 
more TCPs at a longer interval, as discussed before.  
Percent Time in Tactical Flight Mode 
In addition to conflict resolutions, the amount of 
tactical vs. strategic operation can be investigated via 
the amount of time spent flying in either mode, as 
shown in the box plot in Figure 10. As with the pre-
vious figures, the presence of IFR TCPs has a signifi-
cant effect on this variable (p = 0.003). With IFR 
TCPs, AFR aircraft spend on average more than 6% 
of their time flying tactically, vs. 2% to 4% when 
flying strategically and coupled with the FMS. No 
other effects were statistically significant here. 
 
Figure 10. Mean percent time flying tactically. 
The effects observed for this variable are likely 
due to the same causes as for the percentage of con-
flicts resolved tactically; more tactical resolutions by 
definition leads to more time spent flying tactically. 
Lateral Flight-Path Deviation 
Finally, we analyzed a metric related to flight ef-
ficiency: the median AFR lateral flight-path devia-
tion, shown in Figure 11. This variable represents the 
amount of excess path length of the aircraft from in-
itialization to destination when the recorded flight is 
compared with its initial trajectory. Due to traffic and 
weather avoidance maneuvers during the simulation, 
aircraft will experience this path length deviation. 
  
Excessive path length deviation is an indicator of 
flight inefficiency. 
 
Figure 11. Median lateral flight-path deviation. 
The presence of TCPs is significant as in all of 
the other results presented (p < 0.033). Without IFR 
TCPs, the median flight-path deviation is roughly 
3 nmi vs. 1 to 2.5 nmi with IFR TCPs during the 
roughly 240 nmi flight across the simulation area. 
The potential cost savings to be had from the availa-
bility of intent information are appreciable, although 
the results here should be regarded in the context of 
the high traffic density and non-realistic traffic pat-
terns in this simulation. 
No other effect of the number of TCPs and the 
interval was found to be significant on this variable.  
Discussion and Conclusions 
The results presented show the benefit of IFR in-
tent information in the form of ADS-B trajectory 
change reports to the conflict detection and resolution 
performance of an AFR aircraft using the Autonom-
ous Operations Planner. In this mixed-operations si-
mulation, the availability of IFR TCPs reduced the 
number of AFR-IFR conflicts per hour, increased the 
amount of warning time before loss of separation 
when those conflicts were first detected, and reduced 
the amount of tactical maneuvering. On the flight 
efficiency side, in cases where IFR TCPs were avail-
able, the availability of IFR intent information re-
duced the AFR aircraft flight-path deviation due to 
conflict resolutions. 
It was found that two or more IFR TCPs is better 
than none at all, little benefit was found to having 
additional TCPs beyond two. In fact, if the interval 
between TCP broadcasts is long enough, increasing 
the number of TCPs in the sequence can be detrimen-
tal to CD&R performance. 
While the results demonstrate some benefit of 
IFR intent availability for AFR operation, they do not 
show that a solution based solely on ADS-B state 
reports is infeasible. The experiment showed that safe 
operations are achievable with no IFR intent informa-
tion, as evidenced by the low number of losses of 
separation in those cases. Improvements to separation 
assurance procedures and computer algorithms may 
be needed to handle unannounced IFR trajectory 
changes that could result in very-short-notice con-
flicts.  
The value of making IFR intent information 
available to airborne AFR consumers as shown in 
this experiment motivates the inclusion of this infor-
mation as part of the ADS-B message set, or by an 
uplink from a ground-based service such as the Sys-
tem Wide Information Management network. As only 
a small amount of information appears to be required 
(in the form of the first two trajectory change points), 
the bandwidth impact of this recommendation should 
be minimal. 
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